Busy Boards, Cash Holdings and Corporate Liquidity: Evidence from UK Panel Data by Tarkovska, Valentina
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Conference papers Graduate Business School 
2013 
Busy Boards, Cash Holdings and Corporate Liquidity: Evidence 
from UK Panel Data 
Valentina Tarkovska 
Technological University Dublin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/buschgracon 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tarkovska, V. (2013) Busy Boards, Cash Holdings and Corporate Liquidity: Evidence from UK Panel Data. 
European Financial Management association annual conference (2013) in Reading. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Business School at ARROW@TU Dublin. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Conference papers by 
an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. For 
more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
1 
 
Busy Boards, Cash Holdings and Corporate Liquidity: Evidence from UK 
Panel Data 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the effect of board busyness on corporate cash holdings. We offer new 
insights by evaluating two conflicting views regarding the quality of service that busy 
directors provide to corporate boards and their impact on decision making. One view is that  
directors who simultaneously serve on multiple boards improve board decision making 
ability as they have better experience and business connections (reputational effect).The 
opposite view  is that directors  with multiple seats are “too busy to mind the business”, 
which creates  serious agency problems and leads into suboptimal corporate decisions 
(busyness effect). We analyse a large sample of UK listed companies over the 1997 to 2009 
period and document evidence supporting a non-linear relationship between our proxy for 
board busyness and corporate cash holdings. In line with the reputational effect, we find that 
companies with board members that hold seats in other companies maintain a higher level of 
cash, net cash and financial slack. This effect is present, however, only at low levels of board 
busyness. In line with the busyness effect, our findings suggest that as board busyness 
increases beyond a certain threshold, it negatively affects cash holdings, net cash and 
financial slack. 
 
JEL Classification: G3, G32 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Effectiveness, Busy Directors, Cash Holdings, 
Corporate Liquidity. 
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1 Introduction 
A large body of literature focuses on the role of boards of directors in corporate 
governance (see Adams et al. (2010), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for comprehensive 
reviews of the literature). Recent theoretical and empirical research highlights the importance 
of busy directors for board process. Mace (1986), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994), and Loderer 
and Peyer (2002), among others, argue that a presence of busy directors improves board 
advisory and monitoring functions. Harris and Shimizu (2004) find that busy directors are 
important source of knowledge and can, in particular, enhance acquisition performance. Field 
et al. (2011) argue that directors with multiple board seats (due to their experience and 
contacts) are excellent advisors and are on demand by IPO firms. Haunschild and Beckman 
(1998) document a positive effect of having busy directors on a company board, which is    
extended from a single company to an entire corporate system due to the innovation 
dissemination throughout a corporate network. 
Some scholars, however, are more sceptical on the view that busy directors serve 
shareholders’ interests and add value to the firm. Core et al. (1999), Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) and Falato et al. (2014) suggest that directors can become overcommitted when 
serving on multiple boards, rendering them unable to provide meaningful managerial 
monitoring. Fich and Shivdasani (2006), and Jiraporn et al. (2008) demonstrate that boards 
with busy directors are associated with lax corporate governance. Jiraporn et al. (2006) argue 
that busy boards lead to a weaker corporate performance and lower firm value.  
The link between board busyness and corporate cash holdings/liquidity remains largely 
unexplored in empirical literature. In this paper, we hypothesize that board of directors plays 
an important role in a corporate cash management and explore whether multiple directorships 
held by board members affect corporate liquidity. Some of the main responsibilities of 
corporate board are to ensure the effective cash management and to designate the range of 
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cash reserves under the managerial control. Non-operational cash holding is a hedging 
mechanism against “future cash flow shocks in bad times” (Lins et al., 2010) and acts 
as a general corporate insurance policy
1
. Busy directors may significantly affect firm 
effective cash management and liquidity for the following reasons. First, there is a 
resource dependence role, directors with multiple directorships play when they use their 
reputation and external contracts for the advantage of the firm they serving (Means 
(1939), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Zahra and Pearce (1989)). Directors with good 
reputation may secure the competitive advantage of the company to access the required 
financing. Second, labour market creates strong incentives for directors to perform 
better within their “home” company, and as a result, to become better risk managers2. 
Third, executive directors with outside directorships, due to their experience and 
knowledge, are competitive substitutes for a current CEO and, consequently, increase 
CEO performance incentives, resulting in effective cash management and improved 
liquidity
3
. Fourth, these directors are less dependent on their “home” CEO for career 
progression and, hence, can enhance board effectiveness by providing all important 
information to the board of directors
4
.  
However, holding of multiple directorships might negatively affect monitoring 
and advisory capacity of the board for the following reasons. Directors with multiple 
seats “cater” to CEOs and multiple appointments correlate with excess CEO rent 
extraction (Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Core et al. (1999), Falato et al. (2014)). 
                                                          
1
 Lins et al. (2010) found that companies hold excess cash “as a buffer against future cash flow shortfalls”; this 
is a general reason, which ranked as a very important by CFOs and “does not refer to any particular outcome 
stemming from future cash flows that might worry a firm” (p.166).  
2
Fama and Jensen (1983), Fich (2005), and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) argue that director will perform better 
due to the labour market incentives; however, since risk management represents an important task in overall 
directors’ duties,  better performance implies more careful risk consideration.  
3
Fich (2005), and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) advise that CEOs tend to perform better due to the internal 
competition. 
 
4
 Fich (2005), and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) stress that directors with outside directorships  will be inclined to 
provide information of good quality to the board regardless CEO’s will; therefore, board will be better informed 
and will be able adequately assess risks and advise on effective cash management.   
5 
 
Second, busy directors often ignore board meetings by non-attending. By doing so, they 
neglect their duties by not taking part in the important strategic decision-making process 
process (Jiraporn et al., 2008, Falato et al. (2014)). Third, the number of board seats held by 
held by supervisory directors, is positively correlated with accounting fraud, which is an 
an indication to a lack of attention from these directors (Beasly, 1996). Fourth, busy directors 
directors tend to take care of their own reputation and to leave underperforming companies, 
companies, suggesting that the presence of overstretched directors at the board level depends 
on firm performance (Maloney, (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006)).   
In this study, we attempt to provide insights into how board busyness affects cash, net 
cash and financial slack. We measure board busyness as a proportion of directors with three 
or more directorships. In our tests, we control for the important corporate governance 
characteristics (independence, board size, board tenure, proportion of “imported” CEOs, 
directors’ age, and gender diversity) and for various firm characteristics (size, performance, 
dividends paid, and profitability). We use a large sample of 1,275 companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange over the period 1997 - 2009. Our empirical methodology includes 
estimation of panel data by using a pooled OLS model, a fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors, a fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered by industry 
affiliation, a Fama-MacBeth model, and a fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kray (1998) 
standard errors. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are well calibrated when cross-sectional 
dependence is present (Hoechle, 2007). Throughout our analysis, we find consistent support 
for the proposition that relationship between busy boards and firm cash holdings and liquidity 
is non-linear. In particular, companies with board members that hold seats on other 
companies’ boards, maintain a high level of cash, net cash, and financial slack, in line with 
reputational effect. However, when board busyness reaches a certain threshold, a further 
increase in board busyness has a negative effect on cash, net cash and financial slack.   
6 
 
Our findings contribute to the literature in the following key ways. First, this study 
corroborates earlier research establishing a link between firm cash holdings/liquidity and 
board busyness.  Second, while many scholars explore the role of busy directors and their 
contribution to the different aspects of business, we are unaware of any published research 
that investigates a link between firm cash holdings/liquidity and board busyness using the 
UK-based sample. The UK is a particularly attractive setting to study the link between board 
busyness and firm cash holdings/liquidity. The recent financial crisis unsheathed 
shortcomings in the approach to the corporate risk management which is now addressed by 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, pinning boards’ responsibilities in relation to 
firms’ risk oversight. Considering that companies with well managed cash reserves associated 
with lower cash flow volatility (see Froot et al. (1994) and Lins et al. (2010) among others), 
implies that these companies are less exposed to risk of underinvestment. Third, previous 
research   almost exclusively focuses on impact of busy directors on firm performance and 
reputation. We add to this body of literature by showing that multiple directorships also affect 
company’s cash holdings and liquidity. Finally, it has direct implication for the public debate 
on limitation of the number of directorships held by executives. The National Association of 
Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a threshold of three directorships, and the Council of 
Institutional Investors (2003) argues that directors with full-time jobs should not seat on more 
than two other boards. We argue that board effectiveness also depends on the overall level of 
board busyness.  
The reminder of the paper is organised as follow. In Section 2 we review the 
related literature on corporate boards and cash holdings and liquidity and develop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 contains the sample description and summary statistics. Section 4 
provides the results on the relationship between busy boards and corporate cash 
holdings and liquidity, and Section 5 concludes.  
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2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
We consider two alternative objective perspectives used by firms when they elect busy 
directors to the board. The first, referred to as the reputational effect (Jiraporn et al., 2009), 
originates from the resource dependence theory. It reflects the view that companies prefer to 
employ busy directors due to their exceptional advisory and monitoring ability, useful 
network and business contacts. External labour market acknowledges directors’ superior 
managerial skills and talent. As a result, the number of external directorships serves as a 
proxy for director’s reputation (Fama and Jensen (1983), Shivdasani (1993), Brown and 
Maloney (1999), Masulis and Mobbs (2011)). Multiple directorships are beneficial because 
they help executives to develop expertise, learn about different management styles and 
strategies (Bacon and Brown, 1974; Both and Deli, 1996), and build-up a professional 
network. Directors with multiple board seats may use their external contacts for reputational 
purposes (Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)), to open new markets (Means, 1939), and secure a 
competitive advantage in accessing funds (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
Additionally, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) consider the reputational effect 
as an important incentive for directors themselves. Ferris et al. (2003) find a positive 
relationship between number of directorships and firm performance. These findings are 
reinforced in the recent study by Masulis and Mobbs (2011), which relates the presence of 
directors with outside directorships to superior board decision making and better company 
performance. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) contend that inside directors with multiple 
directorships serve a special role on their boards and put forward three reasons to support this 
argument. First, busy directors possess the experience and knowledge to become realistic 
candidates for replacing current CEO and consequently, enhance CEO’s performance 
incentives. Second, additional directorships broaden executive’s career opportunities and 
lessen dependence on “home” CEO for progression; consequently, it becomes easier to 
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express challenging views opposite to those of CEO’s in the boardroom. Third, labour market 
motivates directors to perform better within “home” company, as poor performance ceases 
access to additional directorships, career and reputational benefits. Busy directors, by using 
experience from other companies, can recognise problems faster, minimise preparation time, 
and enhance performance in important corporate decisions, such as acquisitions (Harris and 
Shimizu, 2004). Field et al. (2012) provide evidence that reputable directors are preferred by 
newly public firms, which do not have market navigating experience, and rely heavily on 
expertise and contacts of busy directors. In addition to be beneficial to a single company, 
busy directors positively influence the entire corporate system by disseminating innovation 
through a corporate network (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). In addition, Cook and Wang 
(2011) argue that multiple directorships signal an exceptional ability of the director. They 
investigate trading performance of the directors with multiple directorships and find that 
these directors significantly outperform their counterparts with a single directorship
5
.  
Considering the above arguments, we hypothesize that companies with busy boards are 
expected to have higher levels of cash holdings and better corporate liquidity.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Companies with busy boards maintain a higher level of cash holdings 
and corporate liquidity, ceteris paribus. 
 
The second view on the role of busy directors comes from the agency theory literature.  
directors who overstretch themselves and accept additional seats due to the extra available 
personal perquisites, have incentive to spend less time on each individual board, compromise 
                                                          
5
 Cook and Wang (2011) examine whether this superior performance depends on informativeness (by 
participating on the multiple boards, directors become better informed allowing them to use the obtained 
information and make better trading decisions) or personal ability of the directors. They find that directors’ 
performance depends on the personal ability of individual. 
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their responsibilities and neglect their duties (Ferris et al., 2003)
6
. Studies such as  Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
criticise firms for appointing directors who hold multiple directorships and argue that such 
directors can become overcommitted  and are unable effectively monitor management. Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) establish the inverse relationship between the company’s performance 
and board’s busyness7. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) argue that busy directors can “cater” 
for the CEO increasing an agency costs due to the lax monitoring. They state that busy 
directors are most likely to be chosen if CEO is involved in the selection process. Core et al. 
(1999) contend that busy directors set high compensation for the CEO, which can worsen 
firm performance. Perry and Peyer (2005) and Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find 
that directors view additional directorships as a good chance to improve their incomes before 
retirement. They are not usually penalised for the service of poor quality, and are not fired 
due to the close proximity to retirement. Beasly (1996) uncover a positive relationship 
between an accounting fraud and a number of directorships held by outside directors. Firms 
with busy boards are, on average, more diversified and suffer from diversification discount 
(Jiraporn et al., 2009). Jiraporn’s et al. (2009) findings demonstrate that busy directors serve 
on fewer board committees with lack of committee work involvement causing decline in firm 
value. Cooper and Uzun (2012) provide consistent evidence showing the positive relation 
between busy directors and bank risk. Additionally, Christy et al., (2009) find a negative 
relationship between market risk of equity and multiple directorships held by independent 
board members. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) provide evidence that announcements about 
                                                          
6
 See also Gilson (1990), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) 
(1996), Beasly (1996), Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997), Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Brown and 
Maloney (1999), Shivdasni and Yermack (1999), Miwa and Ramseyer (2000), Bohren and Strom (2001), Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Cooper and Uzun (2012), and Falato et al. 
(2014) who challenge the wisdom of holding too many directorships by examining busy boards’ effectiveness. 
 
7
 Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that increasing number of busy directors leads to board destruction and 
subsequent decline in monitoring intensity. They also find that company’s share price drops when executive 
directors overstretch themselves by accepting additional board seats. 
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departure of busy director
8
 are welcomed by investors with high cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcement day. Falato et al. (2014) examine the implication of director 
busyness on shareholder wealth and find the evidence that independent director busyness is 
detrimental to board monitoring ability.   
Kaczmarek et al. (2012) adopted a notion of faultlines
9
  from the social identity theory 
to their analyses of the board effectiveness. They find that faultlines deteriorate board 
performance, with the deterioration effect being magnified in the presence of busy boards. 
Directors on busy boards will have less time to spend on the important board’s issues, and 
will pay less attention to these issues increasing “salience of divisions based on task-related 
attributes... Such a course of events is therefore additionally detrimental for the cohesiveness 
and communication of the board as a whole” (Kaczmarek et al., 2012: 341). Directors do not 
welcome multiple appointments, and believe that by being involved in too many boards, they 
do not have sufficient time to spend on their professional duties, and, as a result, quality of 
advice and monitoring suffers (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Korn/Ferry International, 1998). 
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesise that busy boards might negative 
effect on corporate cash holdings and liquidity because monitoring and advisory ability 
of busy boards declines. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Companies with busy boards of directors  maintain a lower level of 
cash/liquidity,  ceteris paribus. 
 
                                                          
8
 Resignation of Elaine L. Chao who served as an outside director on boards of six companies due to the 
appointment to the cabinet of the President-elect George W. Bush is used as an example in this study. 
9
 “Group faultlines are defined as hypothetical dividing lines that split a group into relatively homogeneous sub-
groups based on  group members’ alignment along their multiple attribute (Bezrukova, Zanutto, & Thatcher, 
2009; Lau & Murnighan, 1998, 2005) and are most likely to emerge when group diversity is moderate (Earley 
&Mosakokowski, 2000; Lau & Murninghan, 1998; Webber & Donahue, 2001)”, Kaczmarek et al. (2012:338).  
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By simultaneously considering the reputational effect and busyness effect, we argue 
that the link between board busyness and level of cash holdings/liquidity may not be fully 
captured by the simple linear relation. We expect reputational effect to dominate first at a low 
level of board busyness. In line with the busyness effect, as board busyness increases beyond 
a certain threshold, it negatively affects corporate cash holdings and liquidity. This results in 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between board busyness 
and corporate cash holdings/liquidity. 
3 Sample Selection and Data Description 
3.1 Sample selection 
Our analysis is based on   a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. We collect firms’ financial and market information from Thomson 
Datastream, and directors’ information from BoardEx database. The sample period is from 
1997 to 2009 and includes all firms whose information is available from these two databases. 
We collect the following Thomson  Datastream items at the end of each year: earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT), earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA), cash, cash and marketable securities, accounts receivable, accounts payables, 
inventories, cash dividends paid (total), dividends provided/paid-common, preferred dividend 
requirement, differed taxes, total assets, market value, and value of common shareholders 
equity. BoardEx database provides information, such as director’s name, age, gender, role 
title and role description, indication of whether he/she is an executive or supervisory director, 
and number of other directorships held. From this database we obtain information on 98,315 
director-year observations for approximately 1,500 firms, or 12,432 firm-years, over our 13-
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year sample. We merge Thomson   Datastream and BoardEx   data using company’s ISIN 
identifier. We manually collect missing ISINs for some companies on BoardEx
10
. Then we 
exclude financial firms (Datastream ICBIC code 8000), which are highly regulated. We end 
up with an unbalanced panel of 1275 firms and 8296 firm-year observations over the 1997 to 
2009 period.   
We use cash, net cash, and financial slack, all normalised by book value of total assets 
to test the impact of board busyness on corporate cash holdings/liquidity. In particular, cash is 
the value of cash and short-term investments; net cash is a difference between value of cash 
and short-term investments and total company’s debt, and financial slack measure is based on 
traditional credit line arrangements that enable firms to establish operating loans up to fifty 
per cent of inventories and seventy per cent of good accounts receivable (Cleary (1999)). We 
follow Ferris et al. (2003) in our definition of busy boards, and consider a director busy if 
he/she seats on three or more listed companies’ boards. We compute board busyness as a 
proportion of busy directors at the board level (example of board busyness computation is 
provided in Table 2). We also control for firm size, dividend, profitability, and Tobin’s Q in 
our analysis. We collect information about the governance structure of the firm, such as 
proportion of supervisory directors on the board, board duality or whether CEO and 
Chairman is the same person, board size, board tenure, proportion of “imported” CEOs, 
gender diversity, and directors’ age to use as control variables in our study.  We provide all 
variable definitions in Table 1.  Table 2 gives a sample calculation example for Board 
Busyness. 
***Table 1 and Table 2 here*** 
 
                                                          
10
 ISINs were collected from Thomson Datastream, using company name as identifier in this case. All other 
relevant company information   (market, stock exchange, delisting date, etc.) was taken into account and 
considered with high level of discretion in order to assign correct ISIN.  
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3.2 Data description and summary statistics  
Summary statistics are reported in Table 3. We separate data into variables describing 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity (Panel A), director characteristics and board structure 
(Panel B), and firm characteristics (Panel C). Cash and short-term investments in average 
firm represent 17.37 percent of total assets, with some firms holding in cash equivalent of 
100 percent of company value, and some with no cash at all. Net cash, on average, is negative 
0.88 percent. Financial slack is 24 percent of total firm assets in an average firm. The 
directorships per director range from 1 to a maximum of 6.33, with the average of 1.87. This 
implies that on average, directors in our sample tend to have directorship responsibilities at 
1.87 firms. The mean (median) percent of directors holding three or more directorships out of 
the total number of directors per board is approximately 21.73 percent (18.18 percent) and 
ranges from zero to a maximum of 100 percent. The average number of directors on the 
board is 7.90, with a minimum of 4 and maximum of 16 in our sample. The average board 
tenure is 5.47 years in the sample, with maximum of 17 years and minimum tenure of 0.3 
years. On average, 58.17 percent of the board is made up of supervisory directors. Boards in 
our sample have on average 4 percent of “imported” CEOs with some companies employing 
about 67 percent of “imported” CEOs, and others have none of them at all. There are on 
average, 6 percent female directors on the boards in our sample, and this number varies from 
0 to a maximum of 60 percent.  Average director’s age is 54.23 years old, whereas minimum 
age is 34 years and maximum is 69.80 years old. There are 13.22 percent of companies in our 
sample with the CEO and Chairman positions held by the same person.    
Firm size is, on average, 12.52. Profitability is 0.09 on average, which implies that 
EBITDA is at 9 percent of the value of total assets; the average company in our sample pays 
dividends, which represent 2.1 percent of the value of total assets, and has an average Tobin’s 
Q equals to 2.15.   
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***Table 3 here*** 
3.3 Univariate results 
Table 4 presents univariate comparison of key descriptive variables by cash/net 
cash/slack quartiles. We are interested in the difference between firms in first and fourth 
quartiles. To test the hypothesis that the fourth-quartile firms are significantly different from 
the first quartile firms, we use a t-test.  
Panels A, B, and C in Table 2 report results of key corporate governance and firm 
variables by Cash (Panel A), Net Cash (Panel B), and Slack (Panel C) quartiles. Firms with 
less cash/net cash/financial slack, i.e. in the first quartile, differ significantly from the firms 
with the most cash/net cash/ financial slack, i.e., in the fourth quartile. Board Business 
declines monotonically from the first quartile to the fourth quartile of Net Cash/Slack. Firms 
with the most Net Cash/Slack have the least busy boards. However, firms with the most Cash 
have boards that are only marginally busier than firms with the least cash in Panel A, as 
predicted by reputational theory and agency theory. These findings point out to a negative 
relation between board busyness and corporate cash holdings but do not rule out the 
possibility for a non-linear relationship.  
Board size changes in line with the company size from first to fourth quartiles of cash 
holdings, and is not monotonic. Companies in the first quartile of Cash, Net Cash and Slack 
have boards that are substantially larger than the boards of companies in the fourth quartile. 
Board tenure declines monotonically from the first to fourth quartile of cash holdings in 
Panel A, and is not monotonic in Panels B and C. Proportion of supervisory directors on the 
board increases monotonically, which is consistent with the view that board independence 
(the higher proportion of supervisory directors on the board) could lower the agency costs, 
but it is a case only in Panel A. Panels B and C show mixed results with the Board tenure 
declining in Panel B, and remaining nearly the same in Panel C. Proportion of “imported” 
15 
 
CEOs increases gradually from the first to the fourth quartile in Panel A, suggesting that 
more experience directors at the board level are able to reduce agency costs associated with 
the high level of cash holdings. This proportion remains the same through the four quartiles 
in the Panels B and C. The difference in director’s age between the firms in the first and 
fourth quartiles is marginal but statistically significant at 10% level in Panel A, at 5% level in 
Panel B, and insignificant in Panel C. 
As expected, firms with the most cash (net cash/slack) are smaller than the ones with 
the least cash (net cash/slack). Firm size decreases gradually from first to fourth quartile of 
Net Cash in Panel B. However, the univariate relation between corporate cash holdings, 
liquidity and firm size is not monotonic in Panels A and C, with firms in the fourth quartile 
representing the smallest companies in the sample. The firm size declines gradually from the 
first to the fourth quartile of Slack.   Firms in the first quartile of Cash pay more dividends 
than the firms in the fourth quartile.  Firms pay approximately same dividends in all the 
quartiles of Net Cash and Slack. The Tobin’s Q increase monotonically only in Panel A. 
Companies in the fourth quartiles of Cash, Net Cash and Slack have significantly lower 
profitability than companies in the first quartile.   
***Table 4 here*** 
4 Methodology and Results 
In this section we examine whether company cash holdings and liquidity are affected 
by the busyness of its board. We use three measures, namely Cash, Net Cash, and Financial 
Slack
11
. Board Busyness is measured as the proportion of directors with three or more 
directorships on the company board. We include a quadratic term of board busyness,  Board 
Busyness
2 
to capture a potential non-linearity in the relationship between board busyness and 
                                                          
11
 We use annually industry-adjusted measures in our analysis (we compute each industry’s mean per year and 
subtract it from the firm-level variable). 
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corporate cash holdings/liquidity. We include several control variables follow Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), Bohren and Strom (2010), Masulis and Mobbs (2011) and Cooper and 
Uzun (2012). Thus, we include Proportion of SD, which is the proportion of supervisory 
directors on corporate board. Boards with higher proportion of supervisory directors are 
better monitors; consequently, they might inventively observe accumulation and utilisation of 
vital cash recourses. We include natural logarithm of board size (Ln [Board Size]) to control 
for board size. Based on resource dependence theory, it would be anticipated that larger 
boards will have more valuable connections and larger pool of expertise (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004). However, academics provide controversial evidence on the relation between 
board size and company performance, with some documenting positive (Pearce and Zahra 
(1992), Dalton et al. (1998), Jackling and Johl (2009)) while others - negative association 
(Yermack (1996), Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004)). We also include a variable indicating 
whether the CEO and Chairman is the same person (Duality), which is often used in the 
corporate governance literature. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) suggest that Board Tenure 
negatively impacts on firm performance. Accordingly, we consider this variable as a 
determinant of cash/liquidity in our study. We also consider Imported CEO variable in line 
with Bohren and Strom (2010) in the analysis. Director’s Age is included as it might 
approximate the experience as well as useful networks director can bring to the company 
(Ferris et al. (2003)). Older directors might be better monitors but directors near retirement 
age are inclined to accept additional directorships at the expense of monitoring quality. Board 
diversity (Gender) measures a proportion of female directors on the board
12
. Carter et al. 
(2003) suggest that diversity at the board room increases independence and improves 
decision making process.  
                                                          
12
 The Higgs Report (2003), commissioned by the British Department of Trade and Industry, suggests that 
demographic diversity increases board effectiveness and recommends that more women should be included on 
boards. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) advises that “the search for board candidates should be 
conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of 
diversity on the board, including gender” (Principle B.2). 
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We also include natural the logarithm of total assets (Ln[Total Assets]) to control for 
firm size. Lins et al. (2010) argue that smaller firms due to the larger transactions’ costs, 
higher level of information asymmetry, and poorer access to capital markets, might require 
higher level of cash.  We also include Dividend Payout and two measures of profitability, 
Tobin’s Q and a ratio of EBITDA to  total assets (Profitability), to control for the difference 
in management quality across firms, since high volatility in profitability may potentially 
signal poor management skills and competence (Faccio et al. (2011)). We include industry 
dummy variables using the FTAG3 industry code. The inclusion of these dummy variables is 
appropriate given the inherent variability in the cash/liquidity attributes across different 
industries. 
4.1 Methodology  
We use different estimation models in our analysis: a pooled OLS model, a fixed 
effects model, a Fama-MacBeth model, and a fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kray 
(1998) standard errors.  The pooled OLS model (Model 1) can be expressed in the following 
form: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
2
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡    
+  𝛽8𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  
   + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
13
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖
15
𝑘=2
 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                   (𝟏) 
 
The fixed effects or within estimator technique, is based on a deviation from the 
companies’ mean transformation (firm’s mean for the sample interval is subtracted from each 
observation) and estimates all coefficients without estimating individual effects (Model 2). 
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Since we are interested only in slope coefficients, this transformation is a very convenient 
one.  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑̃ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠2̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑠 𝑆𝐷
̃
𝑖𝑡
+  + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑   𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟̃ 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂̃ 𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦̃ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄̃ 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦̃ 𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑̃ 𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
13
𝑗=2
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (𝟐) 
Where the “~” (tilde) notation is used to define demeaned variables. And  
Cash/Liquid it is one of our proxies, i.e. Cash/Net Cash/Slack 
All other variable definitions are in Table 1.  
 
An important issue when dealing with the panel data sets is the estimation of robust 
standard errors.  Ignoring correlation between residuals in the estimation process, results in 
bias and inconsistent conclusion. For example, if standard errors of the estimated coefficients 
are downward biased, the standard errors will be low, and statistical significance of the 
results may be overestimated (Petersen, 2009; Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin, 2012).  To 
account for this, we perform pooled OLS and fixed effects models with robust standard 
errors, robust standard errors clustered by industry, as well as Driscoll and Kray (1998) 
standard errors. We also use Fama-MacBeth (1973) model that estimates cross-sectional 
regression each year and gives the average of time-series of coefficients from annual cross-
sectional regressions. This method eliminates the problem of serial correlation in the 
residuals of a time-series cross-sectional regression.  
4.2 Results  
The results are reported in Tables 5, 6, and 7.  Columns 1 through 5 report estimates 
from Model 1 (the pooled OLS model with robust standard errors), Model 2 (the fixed effects 
model with robust standard errors), Model 3 (the fixed effects model with robust standard 
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errors clustered by industry), Model 4 (the Fama-MacBeth model), and Model 5 (the fixed 
effects model with Driscoll and Kray (1998) standard errors). Looking at the results reported 
in Table 5, we observe that the coefficient on the linear term of board busyness is positive 
and highly statistically significant. The magnitude of coefficient estimate on board busyness 
ranges from 0.087 to 0.127.  These results are consistent with univariate results in Table 4 
and support the claim that board busyness improves cash holdings in line with reputational 
hypothesis.  However, the quadratic terms of board busyness variables have negative 
(coefficient estimate of the quadratic term of board busyness ranges from -0.192 to -0.146) 
and statistically significant (at the 1% level) coefficient estimates, suggesting that impact of 
board busyness on corporate cash holdings is negative when board busyness reaches a certain 
threshold level
13
. This evidence supports the reputation and busyness hypothesis. The 
reputation hypothesis is supported as far as the proportion of busy directors at the board does 
not exceed a threshold level; beyond that, the busyness hypothesis comes into effect. In terms 
of economic significance, one standard deviation change in board busyness results in 0.11 
standard deviations’ change in corporate cash holdings, based on the coefficients from 
Models 1 - 5
14
. 
The results of the analyses of the relationship between firms’ net cash (the difference 
between cash holding and total company debt) and board busyness are reported in Table 6. 
We find that the coefficients of the linear term of board busyness are positive and equal to 
0.084, 0.136, 0.136, 0.175 and 0.135 in Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively and are 
significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the claim that board busyness 
improves net cash level, supporting the reputation hypothesis. However, the coefficients of 
                                                          
13
 We follow Jiraporn et al. (2009) for the estimation of the threshold level. The differentiation w.r.t.  Board 
Busyness results in the following first derivative: 𝛽1 + 2 ∗ 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 . The corresponding threshold 
level of Board Busyness is computed by setting this derivative equals to zero. The threshold level of Board 
Busyness in our sample ranges from 28% to 34%. 
14
 We calculate the change in standard deviation of cash holdings in the following way: (regression coefficient 
for Board Busyness variable x standard deviation of Board Busyness)/standard deviation of the cash holdings. 
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the quadratic term of board busyness equal to -0.165, -0.232, -0.232, -0.272, and -0.219 in the 
Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively and are significantly negative at the 1% level.  These 
results are similar to the results from Table 5, and suggest that initially net cash increases 
with board busyness, but after a threshold is reached, further increase in board busyness 
results in lower net cash level. We find that the turnaround values of the proportion of busy 
directors on the board are not very different from our results from Table 5. Turnaround values 
are in range 0.25 – 0.32. Hence, companies with busy boards are likely to increase their level 
of net cash initially until the proportion of busy directors on the firm board reaches the 25%-
32% threshold level. Further increase in board busyness associates with decline in net cash 
level. This evidence, once again, supports the reputation and busyness hypothesis. In terms of 
economic significance, one standard deviation change in board busyness results in 0.06, 0.10, 
0.10, 0.12, and 0.09 standard deviations change in net cash level, based on the coefficients 
from the Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 
Table 7 reports results of the analyses of the relationship between firms’ financial slack 
and board busyness. The results are similar to the results from Table 5 and Table 6 and 
provide clear indication to the existence of non-linear relationship between corporate 
liquidity and board busyness. The coefficient estimates on board busyness are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% and the 10% levels.  The coefficient estimates of the 
quadratic term of board busyness are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. We 
find that the turnaround proportions of busy directors on the board are marginally different 
from our previous findings and equal to 0.25, 0.35, 0.35, 0.39, and 0.35 considering Models 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. This evidence, once again, supports the reputation and busyness 
hypothesis. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation change in board 
busyness results in 0.06, 0.10, 0.10, 0.17, and 0.08 standard deviations change in financial 
slack level, based on the coefficients from the Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 
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Proportion of supervisory directors on the company board, enters the models with a 
positive sign and is statistically significant, supporting the view that higher level of board 
independence is beneficial to a company. Board Size, measured as a natural logarithm of the 
total number of directors on the company board, has intuitive negative coefficient estimates, 
supporting the view that bigger boards affect company cash holdings and liquidity in the 
adverse way. Board tenure has negative coefficient estimates, but statistically significant only 
in Models 1, 2, 3, and 5, indicating that companies with longer tenured boards  hold less 
Cash, Net Cash, and have lower Financial Slack. We find a positive relationship between the 
CEO - Chairman Duality and Cash, Net Cash and Slack. CEO-Chairman duality results in the 
higher level of power concentration in the hands of one person, who can influence a board of 
directors. The reason for the positive relation between Duality and Cash, Net Cash and Slack 
can be explained by the fact that duality results in a better director’s knowledge and expertise, 
and might affect director’s level of risk aversion. More powerful directors safeguard higher 
levels of corporate cash holdings to protect a company and themselves from the future 
possible financial inconveniences. Imported CEOs might have good connections in addition 
to the expertise they can bring to the company. Our results show a positive relation between 
proportion of imported CEOs and firms’ Cash, Net Cash and Slack. Imported CEOs will 
secure higher cash balances to safeguard future profitable investments and protect their own 
reputational capital. Director’s age, a proxy for director’s experience and reputation is 
positive in all models, but it is not statistically significant in Cash Model 4, Net Cash Models 
2, 3, and 4, and Slack Models 3 and 4. The board diversity measure, a proportion of female 
directors on the board, exhibits positive coefficients, and statistically significant in Cash 
Model 4, all Net Cash models, which suggest that the presence of female directors is more 
likely to improve firms’ cash holdings, and net cash level.  
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With respect to firm characteristics, firm Size (measured as natural logarithm of total 
assets) is negatively related to cash holdings, net cash, and financial slack with all 
coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% level. It might be difficult for large firms 
to accumulate a substantial level of cash, net cash and financial slack considering their level 
of financial commitment. There is a positive relation between a measure of performance, 
Tobin’s Q, and corporate cash holdings and liquidity. Better performing companies are able 
to accumulate higher levels of cash reserves, manage their debts efficiently, and generate 
healthier financial slack. Profitability (measured as EBITDA/Total Assets) coefficient 
estimates are mixed. The Profitability has positive (negative) and statistically significant at 
the 1% level coefficient estimates in Models 2, 3, and 5 (Models 1 and 4).  The negative 
relation can be explained by the necessity to invest more in order to generate higher 
Profitability. Consequently, companies with high Profitability will not be able to accumulate 
high cash and net cash balances, and keep high level of financial slack. These results 
complement results from the univariate analysis in Table 4, which provide a strong indication 
to the negative relation between Profitability and Cash, Net Cash and Slack with statistically 
significant difference in the Profitability associated with first (firms with least Cash/Net 
Cash/Slack) and fourth (firms with most Cash/Net Cash/Slack) quartiles of our cash 
holding/liquidity proxies. Profitability is higher in the first quartile of Cash, Net Cash and 
Slack, than in the fourth quartile. The relation between Dividends and our cash 
holdings/liquidity proxies is positive and statistically significant in all models except for 
Model 1 (Cash regressions), and Model 4 (Net Cash regression). Our findings with respect of 
effect of firm and governance characteristics have on corporate cash holdings/ liquidity are 
consistent with the findings in previous literature (see, for example, Opler et al. (1999)).  
Our results clearly indicate that relationship between board busyness and corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity is non-linear. Corporate cash holdings increase with the increase in 
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corporate board busyness. As far as board busyness reaches the certain threshold level, its 
effect on corporate cash holdings/liquidity becomes negative. Given that high level of board 
busyness represents increase in the demands on directors’ time, it is possible that the 
monitoring effectiveness of directors weakens, which in turn results in lower levels of 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity.  
***Tables 5, 6, and 7 here*** 
5 Conclusions 
We examine the relationship between board busyness and corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity. We offer new insights by evaluating two conflicting views regarding the 
role of busy directors in corporate decision making and by analysing a large sample of UK-
listed companies over the period 1997 – 2009. One view claims that busy directors are good 
stewards and valuable assets for the companies due to their expertise, reputation and business 
contacts, who improve board decision making (reputational effect). The opposite view 
suggests that busy directors are “too busy to mind the business”. Busy directors create serious 
agency problems and lead to suboptimal corporate policies (busyness effect).  
Our analysis reveals that the relationship between the level of directors’ busyness and 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity is an inverted U-shaped. Companies with busy boards have, 
on average, higher levels of cash, net cash and financial slack. However, value of corporate 
cash holdings/liquidity declines if board busyness increases beyond a certain threshold level. 
We interpret these results as consistent with both reputation and busyness effect. These 
results provide strong evidence that board busyness affects firms’ cash holdings and cash 
management behaviour in a complex non-linear manner. To the extent that cash management 
is a key operational decision that affects a hedging against “future cash flow shocks in bad 
times” (Lins et al., 2010), our findings suggest an important mechanism for corporate 
governance to affect firm hedging strategy. The results also emphasize the importance of 
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establishing an optimal level of board busyness for mitigation of agency costs associated with 
excessive cash holdings.  Specifically, board busyness affects cash holdings through the 
quality of directors’ monitoring and advising ability. Previous literature has solely focused on 
individual director’s busyness, and this paper augments the picture by considering the overall 
level of board busyness.  
We add to the literature that considers boards as important contributors to the health 
and competitiveness of the firm (Falato et al. (2014), McNulty et al. (2013)). There is also a 
direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of directorships held by 
executives from our findings. While the National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) 
put forward a threshold of three directorships and the Council of Institutional Investors 
(2003) argues that directors with full-time jobs should not participate in more than two other 
boards in order to guarantee and adequate service, we argue that board effectiveness depends 
also on its overall level of busyness, i.e. on the proportion of the busy directors at the board 
level.   
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Below, the data variables refer to the corresponding corporate governance variable identifiers in the BoardEx 
annual database and to the corresponding corporate cash holding, liquidity and firm characteristics variables 
identifiers in the Thomson Datastream. 
Variable Definition 
 
Corporate governance 
 
Board busyness 
 
 
 
The proportion of board members holding three or more directorships on other 
quoted companies. 
 
Supervisory directors The proportion of supervisory directors on the board. Total number of 
supervisory directors divided by the total number of all directors on the board. 
 
Board size Natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. 
 
Board tenure The average number of years directors have served on the board. 
 
Duality Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Board Chair is the same person. 
 
Imported CEO The proportion of board members who are CEOs (present or retrospective) on 
other quoted companies. Total number of imported CEOs divided by the total 
number of all directors on the board. 
 
Directors’ age The average age of board directors. The sum of all ages divided by the number 
of directors on the board. 
 
Gender The proportion of female directors on the board. Number of female directors 
divided by the total number of all directors. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
 
Cash Cash and short-term investments/ book value of total assets: WC02001/ 
WC02999 
Net cash (Cash and short-term investments – total debt)/book value of total assets: 
(WC02001– WC03255)/ WC02999 
 
Slack  (Cash and marketable securities +0.7accounts receivable + 0.5inventories – 
accounts payable)/ book value of total assets: (WC02001+0.7*WC02051 + 0.5* 
WC02101 – WC03040)/ WC02999 
Firm characteristics 
 
 
Size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets: Ln (WC02999) 
 
Profitability EBITDA/ book value of total assets : WC18198/ WC02999 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
(Book value of assets – book value of common equity – balance sheet deferred 
taxes + market value of equity)/book value of total assets: (WC02999– 
WC03501 – WC03263 + MV)/ WC02999 
 
Dividend   (Dividends provided/paid-common + Preferred dividend requirement)/ book 
value of total assets: (WC 18192+ WC 01701)/ WC02999 
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Table 2. Calculation of Board Busyness variables 
This is an example calculation for our measures of director busyness using BoardEx database data for the 
SAFEWAY PLC (ISIN GB0000492412) for the year 1997. Total number of directorships counts the number of 
directorships (total number of current quoted boards including the “home” company) held by all directors 
serving on the board. Directorships per director are estimated as the total number of directorships held by the 
directors of the board divided by board size. Board Busyness is the number of directors holding three or more 
board seats divided by the board size.  
Director Total 
Directorships 
Colin Deverell Smith 1 
David Gordon Webster 3 
Gordon  Wotherspoon 1 
Patricia (Pat) Anne O'Driscoll 1 
Robert George Charters 1 
Simon Timothy Laffin 1 
Sir Alistair  Grant 4 
Doctor Neville Clifford Bain 4 
Julia Ann Burdus 4 
Michael John Allen 
 
 
2 
Total Directorships 22 
Directorships per Director 22/10 = 2.2 
Board Busyness 4/10 = 0.4 (40%) 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 1,275 firms’ observations for 1997 – 2009 time period, 
excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are in the Appendix 1. Variables Size, Board Size, Board Tenure, 
Director’s Age, Dividend, Profitability, and Tobin’s Q are winsorised at 1% and 99%.  
 
Mean Minimum Maximum Observations 
 
Panel A: cash holding/Liquidity  Characteristics 
    
 
Cash 
  
0.17 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
8945 
Net Cash -0.01 -0.97 1.00 8920 
Slack 
 
  0.24 
 
-0.70 
 
1.00 
 
8751 
 
 
Panel B: Director/board characteristics 
    
 
Directorships per director 
 
1.87 
 
1 
 
6.33 
 
8946 
Board busyness 0.22 0.00 1.00 8946 
Proportion of supervisory directors 0.58 0.00 1.00 8946 
Board size 7.86 4.00 16.00 8946 
Board tenure 5.47 0.30 16.69 8790 
Director’s age 54.23 34.00 71.09 8938 
Imported CEO 0.04 0.00 0.67 8946 
Gender 
 
0.06 0.00 0.60 8943 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
    
 
Size 
 
12.51 
 
7.00 
 
19.43 
 
8911 
Profitability 0.09 -0.99 1.00 8753 
Tobin’s Q 2.15  0.04 24.95 8753 
Dividend  0.02 0.00 0.81 8806 
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Table 4 
Firm characteristics by cash/net cash 
This table presents univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of corporate governance and firm characteristics of 1,275 UK-based publicly traded firms excluding financial 
companies for the 1997-2009 time period. The director and board data comes from the BoardEx database, firm data is from Tomson Datastream. Busy boards are the boards where the percentage of 
directors with three or more directorships is greater than or equal to the sample median. Other variables definitions are in the Appendix 1. The table displays the means and medians (in parentheses) 
of various director, board, and firm characteristics for first, second, third, and fourth quartiles of cash (Panel A), net cash (Panel B), and slack (Panel C).  The t-statistics is for a difference of means 
test from the first to the forth quartile of cash/net cash/slack. Each quartile contains approximately 2230 firm years.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Cash Quartiles 
 
First  
quartile 
Second  
quartile 
Third  
quartile 
Fourth  
quartile 
t-stat 
(p-val) 
Corporate Cash holding/liquidity 
Cash/Net Cash range 0.00 to 0.04 0.04 to 0.10 0.10 to 0.24 0.24 to 1.00  
Cash/Net Cash 0.018 
(0.018) 
0.069 
(0.067) 
0.158 
(0.152) 
0.450 
(0.394) 
111.32***  
(0.000) 
Director/board characteristics 
     
Board busyness 0.21 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.2) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
2.03** 
(0.042) 
Proportion of supervisory directors 0.55  
(0.55) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
0.59 
(0.57) 
0.60 
(0.60) 
9.49*** 
(0.000) 
Board size 7.53 
(7.00) 
7.86 
(8.00) 
7.46 
(7.00) 
6.92 
(7.00) 
-8.75*** 
(0.000) 
Board tenure 5.94 
(5.30) 
5.46 
(4.88) 
5.36 
(4.84) 
5.12 
(4.44) 
-7.85*** 
(0.000) 
Director’s age 54.18 
(54.34) 
54.62 
(54.77) 
54.18 
(54.25) 
54.94 
(54.00) 
-1.69* 
(0.091) 
Imported CEO 0.03 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
7.51*** 
(0.000) 
Gender 
 
0.056 
(0.00) 
0.061 
(0.00) 
0.060 
(0.00) 
0.061 
(0.00) 
2.13** 
(0.033) 
Firm characteristics 
     
Size 12.72 
(12.34) 
13.10 
(12.95) 
12.55 
(12.12) 
11.69 
(11.11) 
-14.12*** 
(0.000) 
Profitability 0.11 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-13.01*** 
(0.000) 
Tobin’s Q 1.55 
(1.23) 
1.66 
(1.38) 
2.13 
(1.63) 
3.28 
(2.33) 
23.40*** 
(0.000) 
Dividend  0.021 
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.00) 
-5.83*** 
(0.000) 
 
Panel B: Net Cash Quartiles 
First  
quartile 
Second  
quartile 
Third  
quartile 
Fourth  
quartile 
t-stat 
(p-val) 
   
-0.97to -0.22 -0.22 to -0.06 -0.06to 0.16 0.16 to 1.00  
-0.30 
(-0.30) 
-0.13 
(-0.16) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.36 
(0.34) 
150.75*** 
(0.000) 
     
0.24 
(0.23) 
0.23 
(0.2) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
-7.24*** 
(0.000) 
0.60  
(0.60) 
0.59 
(0.58) 
0.57 
(0.57) 
0.56 
(0.57) 
-2.88*** 
(0.004) 
8.29 
(8.00) 
8.45 
(8.00) 
7.76 
(7.00) 
6.98 
(7.00) 
-20.62*** 
(0.000) 
5.53 
(4.96) 
5.63 
(5.03) 
5.60 
(5.00) 
5.13 
(4.39) 
-6.35*** 
(0.000) 
54.47 
(54.64) 
54.66 
(54.88) 
54.25 
(54.33) 
54.57 
(53.67) 
-7.25*** 
(0.000) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.92 
(0.355) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.53 
(0.595) 
     
13.17 
(13.01) 
13.14 
(12.88) 
12.42 
(12.03) 
11.37 
(10.97) 
-30.48*** 
(0.000) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
-12.48*** 
(0.000) 
1.82 
(1.42) 
1.69 
(1.36) 
1.98 
(1.48) 
3.04 
(2.11) 
23.36*** 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.014) 
0.02 
(0.017) 
0.02 
(0.016) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-4.74*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 4 (Continued)  
Firm characteristics by slack quartiles 
This table presents univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of corporate governance and firm 
characteristics of 1,275 UK-based publicly traded firms excluding financial companies for the 1997-2009 time period. The 
director and board data comes from the BoardEx database, firm data is from Tomson Datastream. Busy boards are the boards 
where the percentage of directors with three or more directorships is greater than or equal to the sample median. Other 
variables definitions are in the Appendix 1. The table displays the means and medians (in parentheses) of various director, 
board, and firm characteristics for first, second, third, and fourth quartiles of cash (Panel A), net cash (Panel B), and slack 
(Panel C).  The t-statistics is for a difference of means test from the first to the forth quartile of cash/net cash/slack. Each 
quartile contains approximately 2230 firm years.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Panel C: Slack Quartiles 
 
First  
quartile 
Second  
quartile 
Third  
quartile 
Fourth  
quartile 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
 
Corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity 
   
Slack range -0.70 to 0.09 0.09 to 
0.20 
0.20 to 
0.34 
0.34 to 
1.00 
  
Slack  0.08 
(0.08) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
0.24 
(0.23) 
0.50 
(0.43) 
136.56*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Director/board 
characteristics 
      
Board busyness 0.23 
(0.20) 
0.23 
(0.2) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
-3.99*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Proportion of supervisory 
directors 
0.58  
(0.57) 
0.59 
(0.57) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
1.78* 
(0.075) 
 
 
Board size 7.95 
(7.00) 
8.32 
(8.00) 
8.05 
(8.00) 
7.24 
(7.00) 
-10.39*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Board tenure 5.38 
(4.86) 
5.77 
(5.13) 
5.54 
(4.99) 
5.27 
(4.56) 
-2.00** 
(0.046) 
 
 
Director’s age 54.26 
(54.36) 
54.55 
(54.63) 
54.29 
(54.50) 
53.85 
(54.00) 
-2.42*** 
(0.020) 
 
 
Imported CEO 0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
4.03*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Gender 
 
0.062 
(0.00) 
0.059 
(0.00) 
0.059 
(0.00) 
0.060 
(0.00) 
-2.21** 
(0.027) 
 
 
Firm characteristics       
Size 12.81 
(12.37) 
13.01 
(12.71) 
12.72 
(12.48) 
11.66 
(11.30) 
-19.07*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Profitability 0.08 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
-7.12*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 1.79 
(1.41) 
1.75 
(1.35) 
2.01 
(1.51) 
2.97 
(2.03) 
21.04*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Dividend  0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.024) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.85 
(0.395) 
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Table 5 
Board Busyness and Cash Holdings 
This table reports results from an analysis of cash holdings (dependent variables) in our sample of 1,275 firms 
from 1997 to 2009 time period.  Model 1 is a pooled OLS model with year and industry dummy and robust 
standard errors. Model 2 is a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard errors. Model 3 is a 
fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard errors clustered by industry (we use FTAG3 index for 
the industry affiliation). Model 4 is a Fama-MacBeth model. Model 5 is a fixed effects model with Driscoll and 
Kray (1998) standard errors. All variable definitions are in Appendix 1. Standard errors are in parentheses 
beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Model 1 
FE robust 
 
Model 2 
FE robust clust 
 
Model 3 
Fama-MacBeth 
 
Model 4 
Driscoll-
Kray 
Model 5 
Board busyness 0.087*** 
(0.024) 
 
0.101*** 
(0.030) 
0.102** 
(0.044) 
0.127*** 
(0.034) 
0.099*** 
(0.032) 
Board busyness
2 
-0.156*** 
(0.035) 
 
-0.152*** 
(0.045) 
-0.152*** 
(0.045) 
-0.192*** 
(0.028) 
-0.146*** 
(0.032) 
Proportion of supervisory 
directors 
0.122*** 
(0.014) 
 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.027) 
0.066*** 
(0.016) 
-0.026 
(0.016) 
Board size 0.015* 
(0.008) 
 
-0.029*** 
 (0.114) 
-0.029*** 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.027*** 
(0.005) 
Board tenure -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Duality 0.029*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Director’s age 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Imported CEO 0.116*** 
(0.021) 
 
0.024 
(0.028) 
0.024 
(0.012) 
0.079*** 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
Gender 
 
0.023 
(0.020) 
 
0.025 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.034** 
(0.016) 
0.018 
(0.011) 
Size -0.019*** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.035*** 
(0.007) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.039*** 
(0.005) 
Profitability -0.158*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.064*** 
(0.018) 
0.0642*** 
(0.012) 
-0.157*** 
(0.003) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
Tobin’s Q 0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Dividend  0.116 
(0.085) 
 
0.161*** 
(0.056) 
0.161*** 
(0.035) 
0.138** 
(0.0634) 
0.146*** 
(0.048) 
Constant  0.036 
(0.031) 
0.436*** 
(0.076) 
0.436*** 
(0.089) 
0.021 
(0.042) 
0.484*** 
0.068 
Year dummy 
Industry dummy 
R
2
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.17 
Yes 
No 
0.04 
Yes 
No 
0.04 
No 
No 
0.17 
No 
No 
0.06 
Number of observations 8296 8296 8296        8296 8296 
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Table 6 
Board Busyness and Net Cash 
This table reports results from an analysis of net cash (dependent variable measured by the difference between 
firm’s cash holdings and firm’s total debt) in our sample of 1,275 firms from 1997 to 2009. Model 1 is a pooled 
OLS model with year and industry dummy and robust standard errors. Model 2 is a fixed effects model with 
year dummy and robust standard errors. Model 3 is a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard 
errors clustered by industry (we use FTAG3 index for the industry affiliation). Model 4 is Fama-MacBeth 
model. Model 5 is a fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kray (1998) standard errors. All variable definitions 
are in Appendix 1. Standard errors are in parenthesises beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Pooled OLS 
 
Model 1 
FE robust 
 
Model 2 
FE robust clust 
 
Model 3 
Fama-
MacBeth 
Model 4 
Driscoll-Kray 
 
Model 5 
 
Board busyness 0.0847*** 
(0.036) 
 
0.136*** 
(0.045) 
0.136*** 
(0.055) 
0.175*** 
(0.065) 
0.135*** 
(0.046) 
 
Board busyness
2 
-0.165*** 
(0.050) 
 
-0.232*** 
(0.072) 
-0.232*** 
(0.080) 
-0.272*** 
(0.072) 
-0.219*** 
(0.047) 
 
Proportion of supervisory 
directors 
0.106*** 
(0.021) 
 
0.027 
(0.033) 
0.027 
(0.029) 
0.052* 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.026) 
 
Board size 0.027** 
(0.012) 
 
-0.046*** 
 (0.017) 
-0.046*** 
(0.019) 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.038*** 
(0.010) 
 
Board tenure -0.002** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
Duality 0.046*** 
(0.009) 
 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
 
Director’s age 0.002** 
(0.001) 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
Imported CEO 0.192*** 
(0.034) 
 
-0.017 
(0.052) 
-0.017 
(0.041) 
0.065 
(0.055) 
-0.047 
(0.031) 
 
Gender 
 
0.081*** 
(0.031) 
 
0.055* 
(0.030) 
0.055* 
(0.029) 
0.154*** 
(0.042) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
 
Size -0.043*** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.055*** 
(0.009) 
-0.055*** 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.002) 
-0.066*** 
(0.012) 
 
Profitability -0.146*** 
(0.024) 
 
0.172*** 
(0.026) 
0.172*** 
(0.029) 
-0.100*** 
(0.024) 
0.164*** 
(0.029) 
 
Tobin’s Q 0.028*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.003*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
Dividend  0.461*** 
(0.110) 
 
0.273*** 
(0.101) 
0.273*** 
(0.098) 
0.294 
(0.201) 
0.253** 
(0.112) 
 
Constant  0.322*** 
(0.049) 
0.757*** 
(0.116) 
0.757*** 
(0.083) 
0.284*** 
(0.071) 
 
0.835*** 
(0.106) 
 
Year dummy 
Industry dummy 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes                                    
No 
Yes
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
R
2 
0.18 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.09  
Number of observations 8290 8290 8290 8290 8290  
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Table 7 
Board Busyness and Financial Slack 
This table reports results from an analysis of financial slack (dependent variable) in our sample of 1,275 firms 
from 1997 to 2009.  Model 1 is a pooled OLS model with year and industry dummy and robust standard errors. 
Model 2 is a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard errors. Model 3 is a fixed effects model 
with year dummy and robust standard errors clustered by industry (we use FTAG3 index for the industry 
affiliation). Model 4 is Fama-MacBeth model. Model 5 is a fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kray (1998) 
standard errors. All variable definitions are in Appendix 1. Standard errors are in parenthesises beneath each 
coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Model 1 
FE robust 
 
Model 2 
FE robust 
clust 
Model 3 
Fama-
MacBeth 
Model 4 
Driscoll-
Kray 
Model 5 
 
Board busyness 
 
0.060** 
(0.026) 
 
 
0.092*** 
(0.031) 
 
0.092* 
(0.049) 
 
0.138*** 
(0.052) 
 
0.089*** 
(0.028) 
Board busyness
2 
-0.121*** 
(0.036) 
 
-0.131*** 
(0.046) 
-0.131*** 
(0.055) 
-0.176*** 
(0.037) 
-0.126*** 
(0.030) 
Proportion of supervisory 
directors 
0.113*** 
(0.015) 
 
0.008 
(0.024) 
-0.008 
(0.031) 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
Board size 0.040*** 
(0.008) 
 
-0.019* 
 (0.012) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
Board tenure -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Duality 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Director’s age 0.001*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Imported CEO 0.115*** 
(0.022) 
 
0.032 
(0.028) 
0.032* 
(0.020) 
0.075*** 
(0.025) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
Gender 
 
0.018 
(0.022) 
 
0.021 
(0.021) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
Size -0.0250*** 
(0.015) 
 
-0.0396*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0396*** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0183*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.042*** 
(0.004) 
Profitability -0.078*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.098*** 
(0.019) 
0.098*** 
(0.015) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
0.090*** 
(0.018) 
Tobin’s Q 0.021*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Dividend  0.380*** 
(0.084) 
 
0.192*** 
(0.066) 
0.192*** 
(0.041) 
0.404*** 
(0.060) 
0.176*** 
(0.067) 
Constant  0.072** 
(0.035) 
0.471*** 
(0.075) 
0.471*** 
(0.115) 
0.043 
(0.033) 
0.507*** 
(0.057) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry Dummy Yes No No No No 
R
2 
0.14 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.07 
Number of observations 8151 8151 8151 8151 8151 
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